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Previous studies have demonstrated that a censor can recover Tor users’ information by network
traffic analysis (NTA). However, because different Tor browser versions and configurations may
shape network traffic differently, NTA methods agnostic to browser settings may produce inaccurate
results. For example, our experiment shows that the accuracy of website fingerprinting (WF), a type
of NTA attacks that aims to reveal websites visited by a particular user, drops 38.9–95.7% when
the user’s browser version differs from what the attacker expected.
To enhance existing NTA methods, this work takes the first step to explore the feasibility of fin-
gerprinting Tor browsers via NTA and presents a new attack called Tor Browser Version Recon-
naissance (TBVR). TBVR collects traffic data between Tor users and Tor guard nodes and applies
machine learning to predict the Tor browser version a particular user used to visit a website.
A key observation of TBVR is that a user is unlikely to change the browser setting (including ver-
sion) upon every website visit, and thus TBVR can continuously improve its version-classification
accuracy for a particular user. Our evaluation shows that TBVR achieves 99% version-classification
accuracy after seven trials under the closed-world assumption and after 13 trials under the open-
world assumption. Moreover, TBVR-enhanced WF achieves 94% website-classification accuracy,
3% higher than a straightforward WF model trained by a traffic mixture collected from multiple
Tor browser versions.
To reveal why the traffic patterns are distinctive across browser versions, we conduct in-depth anal-
ysis, including statistical testing and changelog inspection. We find that the significant differences
stem from security policy updates and browser optimizations. Based on our analyses, we discuss
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Tor [1] is a well-known censorship circumvention application and has more than two million
daily users [2]. Tor protects users’ privacy and anonymity and hides which websites they visit
through encryption and traffic forwarding mechanisms. To access the Tor network, users usually
install a Tor Browser Bundle (TBB), which comprises a Firefox browser, a Tor proxy, and security
enhancement add-ons (e.g., NoScript and HTTPS Everywhere).
With the rise of Tor’s popularity, researchers have examined a new line of attack against Tor
known as website fingerprinting (WF). The WF attack aims to predict the websites that a particular
user visited through learning-based network traffic analysis (NTA) techniques. This prediction is
possible because different websites exhibit different traffic features, such as the different number
of requests, responses, or packet arrival time [3, 4]. Together with other attack techniques, such
as DNS cache snooping or CDN records analysis, the WF attack is one of the most severe threats
against user privacy in anonymity networks [5]. However, most WF research did not consider the
impact of TBB versions on network traffic. Juarez et al. [6] observed that the website classifier they
evaluated suffer from inaccuracy when the attacker and the user use different TBB versions, but no
explanations were provided.
Inspired by their observation, we hypothesize that incorporating traffic collected from multiple
TBB versions will significantly improve NTA methods’ accuracy. To validate this hypothesis,
We explore the feasibility of a NTA-based TBB recognition attack called Tor Browser Version
Reconaissance (TBVR). This attack aims to predict the Tor users’ TBB versions by performing
version classification on Tor users’ traffic. The attacker will eavesdrop the traffic between Tor users
and Tor guard nodes and apply machine learning to predict the TBB version used by the users.
Because TBB version will not change on a short-term basis, TBVR can be continuously performed
on users and achieve high version-classification accuracy after several trials.
To evaluate TBVR, we systematically address the following research questions through extensive
experiments:
RQ1: Will the TBB version affect a website’s network traffic?
RQ2: Can we accurately predict TBB versions from network traffic?
RQ3: Can TBVR enhance the WF attack’s accuracy when the TBB version is unknown?
RQ4: Why do different TBB versions have distinguishable traffic features?
Table 1.1 summarize the research questions, approaches, and findings.
We conduct a cross-version examination across the latest TBB versions (i.e., 7, 8, and 9) to
answer RQ1. We find that when the training and testing datasets are from different TBB ver-
sions, the website-classification accuracy drops 38.9–95.7%, implying that each TBB version has
distinctive network traffic features, and the difference is significant enough to cause misclassifi-
cation. After confirming RQ1, we build a version classifier to instantiate the TBVR attack and
answer RQ2. TBVR attempts to estimate the Tor browser version by extending the WF attack’s
ML-based approach. We utilize traffic features and algorithms in WF attack research to fingerprint
TBB versions and examine TBVR’s feasibility under various assumptions. TBVR achieves 99%
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Table 1.1: Summary of Research Questions and Approaches
RQ Approach Finding
RQ1 Cross-version examina-tion (Section 4.1)
Low accuracy observed in WF attack, implying
traffic feature differs among TBB versions
RQ2 TBB version classifica-tion (Section 4.2)
88% accuracy in one trial under the closed-world




TBVR and WF attack
(Section 4.3)
The two-phase classifier improves the website-
classification accuracy from 91% to 94% when the





Identify nine informative features and security set-
ting updates that affect traffic features. Addition-
ally, we suspect browser optimization updates will
also influence traffic features.
version-classification accuracy after seven trials under the closed-world assumption and after 13 tri-
als under the open-world assumption. To answer RQ3, we compare our Two-Phase Classifier with
a state-of-the-art WF model called Deep Fingerprinting (DF) for their website-classification accu-
racy when the user’s TBB version is unknown. Our Two-Phase Classifier achieves 94% accuracy,
3% higher than DF, with a lower training cost.
Additionally, we perform statistical analysis and changelog inspection to identify informative
features for version classification and the changes affecting these features. We find that cell fea-
tures (features about Tor packets) are more influential than time or flow features. The ANOVA test
and Tukey-HSD test reveal the difference of these informative features among TBB versions are
statistically significant. From Tor and Firefox’s changelog, we find that the traffic feature differ-
ences are likely caused by security policy updates and browser optimizations. For instance, Firefox
enables TLS 1.3 by default in version 61 and enhances tracking protection in versions 68, 69, and
70. Both have statistically significant impact on the traffic features as our experiment shows. The
findings also imply that TBVR will remain effective against future browser versions whose updates
affect traffic features.
Finally, we discuss possible threats enabled by TBVR and whether it is feasible to generalize
TBVR for NTA-based browser fingerprinting, recognizing users’ browser configurations through
network traffic analysis.
The main contributions of this work are:
• TBVR attack We propose a NTA-based browser recognition attack called TBVR, examine
its feasibility, and show how TBVR enhance WF attack.
• An in-depth root cause analysis We propose a systematic root cause analysis through sta-
tistical analysis and changelog inspection and confirm two security updates introduced in
newer TBB versions affect traffic features.
• Open-source dataset and code Previous published datasets only comprise traffic from sin-
gle TBB version. We publish our traffic datasets (contain multiple TBB version), traffic




Chapter 2 Background and
Related Work
Our work investigates the feasibility of predicting Tor browser versions via learning-based net-
work traffic analysis (NTA) and whether such a version classifier can improve website fingerprint-
ing (WF), a powerful NTA attack against Tor. This section introduces Tor, learning-based NTA,
and WF to provide background on these related techniques.
2.1 Tor
Tor is a low-latency anonymity network consisting of about 6,000 relays around the world. Gen-
erally, users install a Tor Browser Bundle to access the Tor network. A TBB comprises a Firefox
browser, a Tor proxy, and security enhancement add-ons (e.g., NoScript and HTTPS Everywhere).
A newer TBB version includes more recent Firefox and Tor proxy and more security add-ons.*1 The
installation includes setting up a local Tor proxy connecting to a Tor guard node and installing a Tor
browser, which is built on top of Firefox with several privacy-enhancing add-ons. The Tor proxy
receives packets sent from the Tor browser, segments them into a fixed-size (512 bytes) packet
format known as Tor cell, and performs layers of encryption on the data. A Tor cell will then be
forwarded and decrypted by the Tor relays on the circuit path and finally reach the target server.
2.2 Learning-Based Network Traffic Analysis (NTA)
Learning-based NTA techniques are useful for fingerprinting users’ devices [7], operating sys-
tems [8], applications [9, 10, 11], and behaviors [12, 13]. In the NTA research, machine learning
is a popular classification approach and the classification is typically based on three feature cat-
egories [14]: statistical features, time-based features, and graph-based features. Our work also
leverages machine learning and focuses on the statistical features and time-based features about
Tor; we do not include graph-based features as they mainly capture the interaction between multi-
ple end-points.
Learning-based NTA is more challenging in the Tor network because Tor employs several pri-
vacy enhancements to conceal traffic features, such as segmenting packets into fixed-size cells and
encrypting them. Current NTA research on Tor mostly focuses on WF attacks; few studies extended
NTA to other aspects such as user behavior fingerprinting [15] or service fingerprinting [16]. To
the best of our knowledge, none has investigated NTA-based Tor browser fingerprinting.
*1 For example, the latest version of TBB ships with Firefox 78.3.0esr, and the release includes several security en-
hancements such as Protection Dashboard and disabling TLS1.0 and TLS1.1.
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2.3 Website Fingerprinting
Assumptions To evaluate a website classifier, prior work in WF often considers two assumptions
on the attacker’s knowledge, the closed-world assumption and the open-world assumption. The
closed-world assumption assumes the attacker knows the exact set of websites the users may visit.
In this case, the attacker can train a website classifier within this set of websites. The training and
testing datasets comprise traffic instances from an identical website set. On the other hand, the
open-world assumption assumes a more probable condition in the real world: the attacker knows
only a subset of websites the users may visit. Thus, some websites visited by the user are excluded
from the training dataset.
Aside from these two assumptions, in this work, we consider a new assumption called the single-
site assumption to examine the accuracy upper bound of version classification (i.e., TBVR attack).
The single-site assumption assumes that the attacker knows the website visited by the user and
wants to predict the TBB version used to visit the site. Thus, the attacker can train a customized
version classifier for every website. This ideal case is impractical because it requires the attacker
to fully know users’ browsing habits, but it represents an upper bound on version-classification
accuracy.
WF Attacks Many WF schemes use machine learning for website classification. For example,
CUMUL [17] uses an SVM-based machine learning model, and k-fingerprinting [18] combines a
random forest and a KNN-based model. Both CUMUL and k-fingerprinting achieve high accu-
racy (around 90%) in the closed-world assumption and are widely used in subsequent research for
comparison.
Recently, several WF attacks replace traditional machine learning with deep learning to im-
prove website classification. Vera et al. [19] systematically reviewed WF attacks that utilize neural-
network models and concluded deep learning models show better accuracy than CUMUL. Sirinam
et al. [20] developed a WF classifier called deep fingerprinting, which uses a deep learning model
based on convolutional neural networks. Deep fingerprinting achieves a 98% accuracy in website
classification under the closed-world assumption, and its accuracy exceeds other state-of-the-art
classifiers such as CUMUL.
In this work, we take advantage of both the k-fingerprinting and deep-fingerprinting classifiers.
We apply the feature analysis technique used in k-fingerprinting to analyze our attack and identify
informative features. We also use deep fingerprinting as our WF component because it achieves the
highest accuracy among known WF models.
Traffic Features The WF attack classifies websites based on the assumption that each website
has distinctive traffic features. Previous work in WF attacks has considered various of traffic fea-
tures including packet length [18], burst [21], or packet inter-packet time [22]. Li et al. [23] sum-
marized traffic features used in the WF attack and thoroughly analyze these traffic features with
entropy-based techniques. As traffic features for WF attacks are widely studied, and our TBVR
attack also relies on the traffic sent between the Tor browser and websites, we adopt features used
in the WF research.
2.4 Cross-Version Examination
Juarez et al. [6] evaluated the WF attack’s feasibility and found several factors, such as the
TBB version, user’s browsing habits, and users’ location, have a notable impact on its website-
classification accuracy. They performed a cross-version examination on TBB versions 2 and 3
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to test the TBB version’s effect on attack accuracy. Specifically, they collected traffic from 100
websites using TBB versions 2 and 3 and trained a Fast-Levenshtein-based SVM model [24] on
the dataset collected by one TBB version and tested its accuracy on another dataset. The website-
classification accuracy degrades drastically when the training and testing datasets were collected
using different browser versions. However, they did not investigate why TBB versions influence






This section describes our methodology to setup the crawler, collect traffic datasets, and perform
feature selection.
3.1 Crawler Setting
Website List We create a website list (referred to as Tranco*) by deduplicating localized sites
on the Tranco website list [25]. For example, google.com and several of its localized versions such
as google.co.jp and google.co.uk all appear on the Tranco list. However, because these websites
share similar contents and traffic patterns [24], and the WF attack needs not to distinguish them,
we only need to keep one of them. We manually review the top 3500 websites on the Tranco list
and remove redundant websites to generate our Tranco* list.
Crawling Configurations We follow related work’s crawling configurations [24, 6]. That is, the
crawler visits websites in a Round-Robin fashion. After visiting every website once in a round, the
crawler removes its temporary file, rebuilds the Tor circuit, and restarts the Tor browser process.
This procedure reduces the variance due to varying Tor circuits or browser caches. Our crawler is
implemented based on an open-source library, tbselenium [26].
We created four Ubuntu 18.04 virtual machines (VM) with the same settings (location: us-east-
1b, t2.medium) on AWS EC2. For each VM, three crawlers are created to run TBB versions 7,
8, and 9 in three docker containers, and visit a list of target websites. In each container, we use
tcpdump to collect traffic generated by the crawling process.
The page load timeout is set to the default value of 300 seconds. The crawler waits 10 seconds
after the website is fully loaded*1 before termination.
Data Cleaning Traffic instances with fewer packets than 20% of the median size of that site are
considered a failed visit, as suggested in previous research [24]. Therefore, after traffic collection,
we remove websites that our crawler failed to visit and traffic instances that contain fewer packets
than 20% of the median size of that site.
3.2 Data Collection
As datasets used in prior work [19, 21, 24] were collected from one TBB version only, we collect
our own traffic datasets to compare traffic features across TBB versions. In each dataset, we visit
the websites and collect the traffic instances using TBB versions 7, 8, and 9. We select these three
versions because they were released after the drastic increase of Tor usage in 2016. Table 3.1
summarizes our datasets.
Closed-world Dataset Websites in this dataset are known to the attackers based on the closed-
world assumption. Similar to prior work, which selects about top 100 websites from popular web-
*1 As documented in selenium [27], the webpage is considered fully loaded if it completes loading the DOM structure
and sub-resources, including CSS, JavaScript, and images, before the page load timeout.
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site lists [21, 6, 28, 29], we select the top 200 websites from the Tranco* list to be the closed-world
dataset. To reduce bias caused by network instability, we crawl each website 250 times over a
month. We obtain 180 websites after removing the outliers and failed websites.
Open-world Dataset Websites in this dataset should be partially known or unknown to the at-
tacker as defined by the open-world assumption [3]. We consider the worst case and assume the
websites are entirely unknown to the attacker. Thus, the training and testing datasets are disjoint.
The version classifier is required to classify traffic of unseen websites to the correct TBB version.
The open-world dataset contains 3000 websites from the Tranco* Website list after removing those
that appeared in the closed-world dataset. We collect three traffic instances for each website, and
each instance is collected with TBB versions 7, 8, and 9 individually.
Configuration Dataset Through changelog inspection (which we will explain in Section 5), we
observe two critical security updates from TBB version 8 to 9: supporting TLS 1.3 by default
and changes in content blocking policies [30]. To investigate these browser configurations’ impact
on traffic features, we collect a traffic dataset for each of the following three settings using TBB
version 9.0.2: the default (both TLS 1.3 and content blocking are enabled), TLS 1.3 disabled,
and content blocking disabled. To mimic the content blocking policies in version 8, we adjust
the corresponding configurations such as privacy.trackingprotection.enabled and
browser.contentblocking.category. We collect a dataset for each setting. Each dataset
contains 60 traffic instances for each of the Tranco* top 100 websites. This dataset is for testing
the impact of different configurations on traffic features. Despite a relatively small-scale dataset, it
is sufficient to test whether traffic features are distinguishable according to prior work [29].
Table 3.1: Summary of our datasets.
Dataset # of sites # of instances per site
Closed-world 180 250 * 3
Open-world 3000 1 * 3
Configuration 100 60 * 3
3.3 Feature Selection
To generate our feature set, we combine the features used in previous WF and NTA research [23,
18, 21, 22]. Table 3.2 summarizes the 99 features used in our study. These features can be grouped
into three categories:
Cell Features capture statistics concerning Tor packets, including the total number of packets,
incoming and outgoing packets ratio, and packet order. A packet’s order represents the total number
of incoming or outgoing packets seen before that packet. Cell features leak information about how
the browser requests resources and how the server responds.
Time Features include packet timestamp, the interval time between packets, and the interval
time’s wavelet transform.
Flow Features focus on the number of outgoing or incoming flows and their durations. A flow
is a group of consecutive outgoing or incoming packets.
3.4 Model Training
We describe the training and testing data under the three different assumptions. Under the closed-
world assumption, we split the closed-world dataset into a training dataset and a testing dataset.
Under the open-world assumption, we train a version classifier using the closed-world dataset and
validate its accuracy using the open-world dataset. Under the single-site assumption, we use the
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closed-world dataset and split each website’s traffic instances into training and testing. For each
website, we train a version classifier using that website’s training data and test it using its respective
testing data.
Table 3.2: Feature Set Summary. We categorize the 99 features into following categories and
feature type
Category Feature Type Description No.
Cell
feature
Packet Count Number and ratio of incoming and out-going packets 9
Packet Order [18] For each packet, we record total numberof packets sent or received before it 4
Packet Concen-
trate [18]




Packet Timestamp Packet timestamp and packet per second 15
Interval Time Interval time between packet 18
Wavelet Transform Wavelet transform features 30
Flow
feature
Flow Count Number of traffic flows 5
Flow Duration Duration of traffic flow 7
Burst of Outgoing





Using the collected datasets, we answer our research questions by conducting the cross-version
examination (RQ1, §4.1) and evaluating version classification (RQ2, §4.2). The cross-version
examination confirms that one can differentiate TBB versions based on traffic features and the
version-classification examination shows that it is feasible to estimate the TBB version based on
traffic features. Besides, we also show how version classifiers can enhance the WF attack (RQ3,
§4.3). RQ4 will be answered in §5. We provide the summary of our research questions as well as
findings in Appendix 1.1.
4.1 Cross-Version Examination (RQ1)
We hypothesize that existing WF models cannot accurately classify traffic instances to the corre-
sponding websites when the training and testing datasets are collected using different TBB versions.
To validate this hypothesis, we perform the cross-version examination under the closed-world as-
sumption to verify the TBB version’s impact on traffic features.
We use two WF models—random forest and deep fingerprinting, which have demonstrated high
accuracy in previous WF studies. Tables 4.1 summarizes the results. When the training and testing
datasets are from different TBB versions, the cross-version examination accuracy drops signifi-
cantly. When using deep fingerprinting, the website-classification accuracy drops from above 90%
to below 60%. The biggest drop is from 97.6% to 1.9% when being trained by version 7 and tested
by versions 7 and 8, respectively. The result confirms that TBB versions influence traffic features.
Table 4.1: Cross-version examination using the Deep Fingerprinting model and the Random Forest
model
Model Version 7.5.2 (test) 8.0.6 (test) 9.0.2 (test)
Deep Fingerprinting
7.5.2 (train) 97.6% 1.9% 58.7%
8.0.6 (train) 4.5% 91.5% 12.5%
9.0.2 (train) 42% 2.5% 97.7%
Random Forest
7.5.2 (train) 84% 4% 26%
8.0.6 (train) 2.6% 74% 3.4%
9.0.2 (train) 27% 5.2% 86%
4.2 Feasibility of TBVR Attack (RQ2)
We examine the feasibility of the TBVR attack by training a random-forest-based version classi-
fier and testing its accuracy. The version classifier will take the traffic instance as input and predict
the TBB version used to collect it. We consider three scenarios in version classification:
Closed-world Result We split the closed-world dataset into training and testing and train a
version classifier using the training data. The version classifier achieves an 88% accuracy on the
testing data. The accuracy rate is sufficiently high in practice because a user will change the TBB
version infrequently, and the attacker can apply the version classifier multiple times to improve the
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overall accuracy. Expressly, the attacker can assume that consecutive n traffic instances from the
same user will have an identical TBB version. Therefore, an attacker who continuously eavesdrops
on traffic can apply the version classifier n times and output the model value as the final prediction.
As n increases, the accuracy will grow close to 100%. The equation is provided in Appendix 9.1.
Open-world Result We train the version classifier with the closed-world dataset and test its
accuracy with the open-world dataset, resulting in a 79% accuracy. The attacker can repeatedly
apply the version classifier based on our assumption and reach 99% accuracy after 13 trials. Thus,
under the open-world assumption, the TBVR attack requires additional trials to reach the same
accuracy. The result is expected and implies that the TBVR attack can shorten its prediction latency
by gathering additional information about the websites users may visit. For instance, users’ hobbies
or interests reveal information about the type of websites they may visit.
Note that because this work aims to evaluate the feasibility of TBVR, we did not invest in fea-
ture engineering or ML model optimization. We expect the accuracy can be improved further via
sophisticated ML models and techniques and extra data-processing efforts.
Single-site Result We examine each website’s version-classification accuracy and compare the
results with the closed-world assumption. Figure 4.1 shows the accuracy gap between the single-
site assumption (an ideal case) and the closed-world assumption (a relatively realistic case). The
result under the single-site assumption is always better: The attacker can identify the TBB version
for 156 out of the 180 websites with more than 90% accuracy under the single-site assumption,
whereas the number of websites drops to 74 under the closed-world assumption. The considerable
gap between the single-site and closed-world assumptions implies that information about users’
browsing habits helps TBVR attacks and that there is still room to improve TBVR.
4.3 Two-Phase Classifier (RQ3)
Previous research often implicitly assumes the user and the crawler uses an identical TBB ver-
sion. However, as we showed in the cross-version examination, the TBB version is a critical factor
that substantially affects classification accuracy. Thus, we relax this assumption and propose a WF
attack model where the user’s TBB version is unknown to the attackers.
To examine the feasibility of the WF attack, we propose a two-phase classifier consisting of a
version classifier in the first phase and a WF classifier in the second. Using the two-phase classi-
fier, the attacker first identifies the TBB version via the TBVR attack and uses the corresponding
WF classifier to predict the website. We call it TBVR-enhanced WF. We implement a two-phase
classifier whose first phase uses random forest and second phase deep fingerprinting.
As we briefly explained in Section 4.2, the first phase (the TBVR attack) can achieve 100%
accuracy after multiple runs. In our evaluation, it achieves 99% accuracy within seven trials.
The second phase applies deep fingerprinting for website classification, and overall we obtain
an accuracy of 94% under the closed-world assumption. In summary, a two-phase classifier can
accurately recognize the TBB version and the website visited under the closed-world assumption.
To examine the WF attack’s enhancement after applying TBVR, we compare our Two-Phase
Classifier with Deep Fingerprinting on the closed-world dataset. We directly train on the closed-
world dataset to construct the DF model. The DF model achieves 91% accuracy, whereas our
Two-Phase Classifier achieves 94% accuracy. The result highlights the advantage of the two-phase
classifier and TBVR: They take advantage of the fact that the user will likely use the same browser
version for a while, whereas the DF model is oblivious to this information and has to re-predict the
version every time.
Besides a lower accuracy, the DF model suffers from a scalability issue because the attacker has
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Fig. 4.1: Histogram of website-classification accuracy, showing the # of websites whose accuracy
are within the given range.
to train a new DF model whenever a new TBB version is released, and the training process is slow
and resource-consuming. On the other hand, a two-phase classifier can be efficiently constructed
and maintained because the attacker only needs to train a new DF model on data collected from the
new TBB version instead of the entire dataset, and the random forest model is more efficient than
the DF model. For example, it takes an entire day and consumes up to 11GB of memory to train the
DF classifier over 180 monitored websites, and the training cost will drastically increase with the
number of monitored websites. On the other hand, it takes less than ten minutes to create the first
phase (the random forest model) and an additional 10 hours to create the second phase (the three
single-version DF classifiers) in our two-phase classifier. Because the single-version DF classifier




Chapter 5 Analysis (RQ4)
This section investigates why TBB versions affect traffic features via a statistical approach and
changelog inspection.
5.1 Feature Analysis
We quantify a feature’s influence and identify the most informative features, which have the high-
est impact on TBVR’s version classification over the websites in the closed-world dataset. We train
a version classifier with the random forest model for each website in our dataset and record each
model’s top 10 informative features. We end up having 180 version classifiers, and each classifier
deals with the version classification of one website. Subsequently, we extract the top 10 informa-
tive features of each version classifier and count each feature’s occurrences. Table 5.1 lists nine of
the most informative features, which have the highest occurrences in the top informative features
among the 180 version classifiers. Since the 10th feature has a drastic drop in its occurrences, we
focus on the top nine informative features.
The results indicate that cell features are more influential than time or flow features for version
classification. Traffic features concerning the alteration in packet orders or quantity Traffic features
have apparent differences among TBB versions, but those concerning packet arrival time or flow
duration do not. One possible explanation is that the packet arrival time and flow duration are
mostly dependent on Tor’s network condition. Another possible reason is that the informative
features for WF are not necessarily informative for TBVR. One future direction would be to explore
new time or flow features that might help the TBVR attack. Figure ?? illustrates the value difference
of incoming packet ratio of the three selected websites among three TBB versions. Overall, we
observe traffic difference among these three versions for most of the websites.
Table 5.1: informative feature list.
Feature # Occurrences Feature Type
Average of outgoing packet order 175 O
Standard deviation incoming packet order 172 O
Number of incoming packet 171 N
Average of incoming packet order 170 O
Number of Packet 168 N
Outgoing packet ratio 166 N
Incoming packet ratio 164 N
Standard deviation of outgoing packet order 149 O
Number of outgoing packet 145 N
N: Number of Packet, O: Packet Orders
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Fig. 5.1: The incoming packet ratio difference among TBB versions of three selected websites. The
result confirms observable differences in traffic features when users use different TBB versions, and
assuming an incorrect version will affect the accuracy of the WF attack.
5.2 Statistical Analysis
Our null hypothesis H0 is that there is no significant difference between the mean value of the
informative features when using different TBB versions. We executed an ANOVA per feature, each
of which returned a p-value ≤ 0.05 allowing us to reject each feature’s null hypothesis.
However, none of the nine features has a significant difference for pinterest.com, and only one
feature is found notably different in urbandictionary.com among the three TBB versions. The
reason is that the nine features in these two websites are only capable of separating one TBB version
from the other two. Thus, a combination of multiple features is required in this analysis to observe
the traffic difference. The results imply that most of the websites exhibit distinguishable features
across three TBB versions, thereby providing an insight into version classification’s success.
5.3 Changelog Inspection
To uncover the root cause, we scrutinize the changelog of Tor proxy [31] and Firefox [32] and
identify updates that may affect network traffic in this section. Table 5.2 and table 5.3 demonstrates
part of the records of TBB and Firefox updates in the three tested TBB versions.
Security Policy Update Several security updates disable outdated or insecure cryptography al-
gorithms that were once supported in earlier versions. For instance, Firefox has set TLS1.3 by
default since version 61 and has introduced several tracking protection configurations. Changes in
the content-blocking policy may increase or decrease the amount of transmitted user information,
and influence traffic flows.
Browser Optimization Changes in performance improvement may also influence the number
of packets and traffic flow duration. For instance, Mozilla launched a new project known as Elec-
trolysis (E10s) [33] in 2016 and had deployed it to production in 2018. E10s was a multi-process
system for improving the performance of web page loading. With the multi-process mechanism,
Firefox may better handle large chunks of web server responses in a short time, thereby altering the
traffic features such as traffic bursts or numbers of packets in a fixed duration.
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Table 5.2: TBB and Firefox version mapping











Firefox E10s development (ver. 52ESR) Osafe browsing update (ver. 56) S




TLS1.3 by default (ver. 61ESR) S
block ftp sub-resources (ver. 61) S
media encoding algorithm (ver. 67) O
Tor circuit padding negotiation (ver. 0.4.0.4) O
9.0.2 - Firefox
tracking protection (ver. 68,69,70) S
block autoplay (ver. 78ESR) S
client certificate features (ver. 78ESR) S
Tor flow control (ver. 0.4.1.2) O
S: Security policy update, O: Browser optimization
5.4 Impact of Different Configurations on Traffic
As described above, these updates may lead to changes in various traffic features of some web-
sites. This section focuses on analyzing different security settings and providing statistical evidence
proving their impact on traffic features. As the optimization updates are difficult to adjust in the
browser configurations, we leave it as future work to statistically validate the optimization updates’
impact.
We focus on two security settings among TBB versions 7, 8, and 9: the TLS1.3 settings and con-
tent blocking policies. TLS1.3 is enabled by default since TBB version 8, and several content block-
ing configurations are added to TBB version 9 (e.g., privacy.trackingprotection.enabled
and browser.contentblocking.category). To validate their effect, we examine three
configurations: the default settings, disabling TLS 1.3, and disabling content blocking policies.
The data collection process of this configuration dataset is described in Section 3.2. Figure 5.2
and 5.3 visualizes the variance of the number of outgoing packets, allowing us to identify
inconsistencies across different browser configurations visually. For most of the websites, the
number of outgoing packets increases or stays the same when TLS 1.3 is enabled or when content
blocking is disabled. The differences are statistically significant.
In summary, we observe traffic feature inconsistency when enabling different configurations, and
these configurations are part of the updates between TBB versions 8 and 9. Thus, we conclude that
updates between versions can affect website traffic and result in observable discrepancies that we
can leverage for differentiating TBB versions.
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Fig. 5.2: Traffic Variance Caused by TLS Configuration





As TBVR attack shares similarities with the WF attack in their methodology, existing WF de-
fenses can be applied to mitigate TBVR. For example, WTF-PAD [34] was known for its low
latency by padding dummy packets to conceal the burst features. Walkie-Talkie [35] performed
traffic morphing so that websites share similar traffic features. BuFLO [36] provides strong resis-
tance against the WF attack while introducing high bandwidth overhead and latency.
Defenses against WF attacks can also be applied to TBVR attack. General countermeasures
include adding dummy packets or morphing traffic to conceal the traffic features difference among
TBB version, whereas latency and overhead are still a concern for these approaches.
6.2 Impact of TBVR
In our experiment, we discover that security settings difference among browser versions will
lead to the traffic feature difference, and these differences are significant enough for the TBVR
attack to succeed. TBVR attack can be difficult to mitigate because new browser version release
will inevitably contain updates affecting traffic features, making it a persistent threat against users’
privacy.
Additionally, NTA-based browser fingerprinting is an extension of TBVR and may become an
emerging threat against users’ privacy. Traffic feature difference caused by different configurations
make it possible for the attacker to fingerprint users’ browser setting through NTA. Browser fin-
gerprinting has been regarded as a severe problem against users’ privacy. A common approach
for browser fingerprinting is invoking JavaScript functions that access information such as browser
version or settings [37]. However, this approach requires users to visit the websites created by
the attackers. NTA-based browser fingerprinting offers another approach to explore users’ browser




This study systematically investigated the effects of the TBVR attack and analyzed the root
causes. We confirmed that each tested TBB version generates distinguishable traffic features and the
TBVR attack is highly feasible when the attacker can continuously eavesdrop on traffic. Moreover,
we found that the TBVR-enhanced WF attack outperforms the state-of-the-art WF model when
the user’s TBB version is unknown, and the attack will likely remain effective in the future TBB
versions because the differences result from essential security updates.
An interesting future direction is to extend TBVR to NTA-based browser fingerprinting, predict-
ing not only Tor browser version but also other settings and other browsers via NTA techniques.
Existing browser fingerprinting approaches often rely on JavaScript to access information such as
browser version or settings [37] but require users to visit attacker-controlled URLs. NTA-based
browser fingerprinting offers an alternative to infer users’ browser configuration. Another direction
is to improve TBVR’s accuracy by incorporating state-of-the-art learning techniques and feature
engineering, and transfer learning may also be applied to create new classifiers for other browser
versions with less training data. Although our research focuses merely on the Tor browser and only
applies basic learning models to verify our hypothesis, we hope our work can help advance a new
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9.1 TBVR’s Accuracy after n trials
This section gives details about the high TBVR attack accuracy under closed-world and open-
world assumption mentioned in Section 4.2. Formally, Equation 9.1 represents the success rate of
version classification after n trials. The overall success rate, P , indicates the probability of getting
more than N/2 correct predictions after n trials. Suppose the single-trial success rate is p. If p is
higher than 0.5, the overall success rate will grow as n increases. Moreover, if p is closer to 1, P
will converge to 1 more quickly. When p = 0.88 (the single-trial success rate in our experiment
under the closed-world assumption), we can reach a 99% accuracy in seven trials.
• n: The number of trials
• P : Probability of getting correct results after n trial




Cni ∗ (1− p)i ∗ pn−i (9.1)
